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6. On July 13,1958, Beulah Patience, the wife of a farmer, wrote to the Demonstrable
Appliance Co., stating that she wished to buy a good washing machine but was unable
to go to town because of the demands of her new-born son. She requested c.o.D.
delivery of such a machine. Demonstrable selected a washing machine from one of
s~veral makes which it sold, and sent it C.O.D. to Beulah, who paid for and accepted
delivery thereof. Accompanying the machine was a written guarantee by Demonstrable
containing the following language: "Seller guarantees that the machine is free of
defective material and workmanship. The machine will be serviced for one year free
of charge. 11 The first time that Beulah attempted to use the machine she learned that
it was not suitable for ordinary laundry work because it would not drain properly
and, on calling the repairman from Demonstrable Appliance Co., she was informed that
the difficulty arose from the manner in which the machine was designed and that the
trouble was not due to defective material or workmanship. Upon claim being made,
Demonstrable denied liability on the ground that it had not expressly warranted the
design and operating efficiency o.f the machine. Beulah consults you as to her right,
if any, against Demonstrable Appliance Company. What would you advise?
(SALES) I would advise that she could rescind the sale and recover her payment, or,
sue for .damages for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and suitability
since the seller held himself out as having special knowledge and knew the purpose
for which she wanted it and chose the machine for that purpose. An express warranty
does not negative and implied one where the two are not inconsistent.
Question 6 on page l+68 (Sales). A washing machine that is designed in such a way
that it is not suitable for ordinary laundry work is not a merchantable machine.
Under u.c.C.#2-314 unless excluded or modified, a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is. implied in a contract for their sale if the seller i.s a merchant of
goods of that kind. So, sam~ result for same reason under u.c.c.
7:> 5'7
10. In September, 1958, White Heat Co. exhibited to John's Cafe in Luray, Virginia,
a floor oil heater which White Heat represented would heat the entire cafe even in
the co~dest weather. John Dye, the proprietor of the cafe, told White Heat's salesman that, because the heater was so small, he doubted it could do the job, but that
the price was so attractive he would try it anyhow. They agreed orally that White
Heat would install the heater on a trial basis until it had been tested in the cold~
est weather, and that if it did not heat the cafe under these circumstances John
could return it. Late September, 1958, Luray suffered a severe and unseasonable co.l d
spell, during which time, although the heater was fully f ired, the tempearature in
the cafe remai ned in the 40•s. When the cold weather persisted, Jorm Dye finally
decided to seek warmer clL~es, and he locked up the cafe and went to Florida early
in October, 1958. Upon his return to Luray in July, 1959, an action was instututed
against him by White Heat Co., seeking to recover the purchase price of the heater.
John immediately asks your advice as to whether he is liable. How should you
advise him?
(SALES) John is liable. This is a sale on approval. John had a reasonable time in
which to return the article if he was not satisfied after he had had a reasonable
opportunity to try it out. He had such an opportunity in late September of 1958.
July 1959 is too late as the vendor could reasonably assume that all was well since
he had heard nothing to the contrary. There is no cause of action for breach of
warranty as John did not rely on the warranty, but on his own personal test. See
193 Va.831.
Q.lO on p.483(Sales) The same result would be reached under U.C.C.#2-327 which rear
in part, 11 (1) Under a sale on approval unless otherwise agreed ***(b) ·:HH~failure
s easona1bly to notify the seller of election to return the goods is acceptance."

4~~~th

went into the shoe store of Douglas and, after trying on several pairs of
shoes, selected one that fitted and suited him, and said of a partic~lar pair of
shoes: ui will take this pair; wrap them up for me am keep them unt1l I attend to
another errand and I will come back, pay for them and pick them up on my way home •
I don't want to be bothered with them now so just keep them for me". The clerk
thereupon said: nAll right, Mr. Smith," and proceeded to wrap up the shoes and put
Smith's name on the package. Smith r eturned in about an hour and found the store in
flames caused by a fire of unknown origin.
·
Is Smith liable to Douglas for the purchase price of the shoes?
.
(SALES)Yes. The title to the shoes passed when a particular pair was uncond1tionally
appropriated to the buyer with the assent of the seller. When buyer left the.shoes
with seller he made the selle.r a bailee for the buyer. Since there was no ev1dence
of negligence on the part of the seller the loss is on the buyer who was the owner
of the shoes when they were destroyed.
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on P·497(Saies) Smith is not liable under the U.C.C. He was not in default at

th~ time of the fire, seller was a merchant, and possession had not been given t o

Sm1th. Seller is in a better position to protect the goods and is more apt t o have
them insured. See U.c .C .#2-509 and Comment 3 thereon. ·

7 .'!>Mckey offered to sell to Parsons 50 1 000 bricks, the contents of the kiln.
Parsons saw the exterior of the kiln and some of the bricks which had been taken
from the kiln which appeared to be in good condition. To induce the sale, Mickey
stat~: "They are good brick and all right. 11 Parsons could have gone to the top of
the k1ln, removed three layers of boards and some bricks and discovered a "cold
spot" in the kiln where 10 1 000 of the bricks were imperfectly burned. Parsons did
not do this and the seller knew that he did not; however, the seller also was
unaware of the existence of this cold spot a t the time of the acceptance by Parsons.
Upon delivery the defects were discovered. Parsons refuses to pay and Mickey sues
for the purchase price agreed upon for the bricks. The defendant claims a s et-off
for the defective bricks. Should the set-off be allowed?
(SALES) Yeso There was an express warranty that the brick were all right. Since defendant relied on this warranty he owed no duty to inspect the brick in advance.
.
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:t O'Slt1me Corporation of .America accepted the order of Orville Lund, a merchant i n
t he City of Richmond, to ship him 80 bags of lime at an agreed price, F .O.B.,Alba ny,
tJ,,y<. At about the same time, Lime Corporati on accepted comparable orders f or 600
more bags of lime placed by other buyers in the Richmond area. Thereafter, and wit h
Lund ' s knowledge, Lime Corporation shipped all 680 bags from Albany in one rai lroad
car . Through no fault of Lime Corporati on, half of the bags were spoiled in t ransit.
Lund was one of the last of the buyers to go to the fre i ght station to obtain his
bags of lime, and by that time those bags which had arrived in satisfactory condit i on had been taken by other buyers. Thereafter, Lund having i gnored billings s ent
him by Lime Corporation, the Corporati on br ought an action agai ns t him in t he Law
and Equity Court of the City of Richmond for the agreed purchas e pri ce.
Do es Lund have a good defense to the action?
(SALES) No. Lund and the others were tenants in common of fungible goods. Title
passed to all the lime at .the time of shipment. The loss should be shared pro- rata
among all the tenants in common. This answer assumes that all the buyers knew t he
lime would be shipped in this manner. See 139 Va .92 in which sugar was shi pped as
above set forth.

•

•

8 ~& bhemical-Plastlcs Corporation owned and operated its manufacturing plant in the
state of Virginia. It received an order from t he Plastics Products Corporation for
a carload of plastic materials, the character and qualit,y of which were specified
in the written order. Pursuant to the directions contained in the order Chemical. Plastics Corporation shipped the plastic mater:i.als to the New York plant of the
buyer, f. 0 • b. the shipper's plant in Virginia. The agreed purchase price was to
be paid ten days after the materials had reached the plant of the buyer. Upon the
arrival at buyer's New York plant of the car car~ring the plastic materials and
before its unloading, the buyer dir ected the carrier to haul the materials to the
buyer's plant in Chicago. The carric:r immediately compliad with this order. While
the plastic materials were enroute f:·om the New York plant to the Chicago plant,
the seller received notice that the onyar ·was at that time insolvent, and had been
adjudicated a bankrupt. Chemical-Plastics Corporation immediately directed the
carrier not to deliver the plastic materials to tl1e Chicago pla.nt of Plastics Products Corporation but to hold the car of materials in the carrier's yeards at Chicago
until the seller could make a resale thereof. The carrier complied with the direc-

546.
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tior:.s it received from the seller. The trustee in bankruptcy sought to recover
nossession
of the plastic materials as ass&ts of the buyer.
1
Is the trustee in bankruptcy entitled to recover possession of the plastic
mate rials?
(SALES) The trustee in bankruptcy is entitled to recover possession. The original
t ransit was over. The carrier has atto:rned to the buyer, i.e., has recognized hi m
as the owner and made a new contract of carriage. It is the same as if the carrier
had delivered the goods to the buyer, and then the buyer ht'td re-shipped them. Hence
selleris right to stop in transitu goods the title to which had passed has been
terminated. See Williston on Sales, §§ 520 et seq.
·
~· 8 on ~·545{Sales) The answer is quite different under the u.c.C.#2-702(2) of
1-1luch provJ.des that ·where the seller .discovers that the buyer has received aood
·t h'l ·
1 t he may rec~~1m
· the goods upo? demand made within ten o d':lyss on
c~~ d1 w 7 e_J.ns~ ven
afver the1r rece1~t. Moreover wh1le the seller's r1ght of stoppage in transit is
~ut.off by a reshi~m~nt(U.C~C.ff2-705(2)(c) it is not cut off by a diversion which is
1nc1dent t? the or1g1nal sh1pment. A direction by the buyer to the carrier to t ake
the goods vO the buyer at another place would be a divers t on rathe~ than a reshipmen~~ See Comment 3 to UoC.C~#2-705. Hence buyer's trus~ee in bankruptcy is not
entlt;ed to the c~:: load of plastic ma.terials . The basic reason for this is that
buye:: s ?ther creal tors should not be allo1-1ed to profit because of buyer I' s fraud
who liTlplJ.edly represents that he is solvent when he buys on credit.
~ ·Y

7. §hase 1ong desired to own a Stutz automobile, and on Jan.l8,1962, a salesman of

•

Antique Car Co., of Richmond, showed him a 1912 Stutz. Chase explained to the salesman that he wanted the car for his normal transportation needs, as well as for its
antique value, and that it must be in perfect working condition. The salesman assured
him that the Stutz was in perfect working order, that its engine had recently been
entirely overhauled and worn out parts replaced with new parts. Chase drove the car
around the block and remarked to the salesman that the engine was firing erratically
causing a jerking motion. The salesman replied that the parts were so new that they '
were not properly "seated" but that within several days of driving the trouble would
disappear. On this assurance Chase bought the car and drove it home. For several
days the engine's irregular firing continued, and on Jan.22,Chase returned the car
to Antique for an explanation. Antique's reply was that the parts had not yet
•seated". When the trouble persisted, Chase returned the car again to Antique on
Feb.9, and again on March 13. Antique gave as an explnation of the trouble that the
car's parts were taking an unusually long time to ''seat" themselves.
On June 18,1962, Chase consults you and tells you the above history of his car and
further that the trouble still persists although he has driven 2,800 miles. He tells
you also that on May 1, 1962, he was told by an expert mechanic that the replacement
parts in the car were in fact taken from another 1912 engine and were too worn to
give perfect performance. Chase asks you whether he is entitled to return the car
to Antique and recover his purchase price. How should you advise him.
(SALES) I would advise him that he has waited too long to rescind. He found out on
May lst that the statements made to him were false. He should have rescinded shortly
thereafter. Six weeks later is an unreasonably long time. See 1$2 Va.635.

7 P~mer exhibited to Dealer samples of his peanuts but said that the bulk of the
peanuts was not as good as the sample ~ Dealer said "Bring them to my warehouse and
I will look at them; good peanuts are worth $13 a bag and I will give you that for
them." Farmer replied nAn right," and tile next day delivered 500 bags of peanuts to
the warehouse and Dealer, without opening the bags, shipped them to his commission
merchant in New York, who sold them for Dealer's account. The peanuts were not as
good, on an average, as the samples and brought on the market only $10 a bag.
Dealer consults you as to whether he is liable to Farmer, on the above facts, for
the $13 per bag. How ought you to advise him?
(SALES) Dealer is liable. He waived his rignt to examine the peanuts when he did not
take advantage of his opportunity to inspect. He was told by Farmer that the peanuts
were not up to sample so there was no fraud or misrepresentation. Dealer had no
right to sell the peanuts until he had the title and acceptance of Farmer's offer
was necessary for him to have the title. 78 Va . 2t;),.
Q. J on p.575(Sales) The u.c.c. does not specifically cover this question. There
is no reason to believe that the answer would be different under the u.c.c.

7 f bJn March 1,1963, Winchester Feed Co. entered into a contract to sell 100 bags of
#2 turkey feed to Harrisonburg Poultry Co. at $15 per 100 lb. bag. The contract
provided delivery to be made by truck to Harrisonburg late in March. On March 25th,
Feed Company dispatched their truck to Harrisonburg for delivery of the f~ed. However, upon arrival at Harrisonburg, the Poultry Co. refused to accept del~~ery from
the truck driver, and ordered him to return the feed to Winchester. The_dr~ver
immediately returned to Winchester with the feed and a letter from Harr~sonburg
Poultry Co., which read as follows:
"March 25,1963
"To Winchester Feed Company
We will not acc~pt this order. The drastic action of the Europ~n
Common Market has created a crisis in the turkey market, and the pr1ce
of turkey feed has dropped substantially.
(s) Harrisonburg Poultry Company".
~ ~u ~

1t!ha~ remedies, i f any, are available to Winchester Feed Company?
( Si .. LES ) Si nce the title to the feed has pas sed Feed Company may recover the price
of $1)00 . Or, after noti fication to the buyer, Feed Company may resell the fee~ at

•

t he best pr ice obtainable and hold Poultry Company for any deficiency plus reasonal)} -'
r::harg es i ncurred for transportation and storage.
Nota : Under Section 2-709 of the u.c.c. neither the passing of title to the goods,
nor t he appoint ment of a day certain for payment is ma te~ial to an action for the
pri ce , Such <.>.n ac t ion lies only for goods accepted or for conforming goods .l ost or
damaged within a commercially reasonable time after risk of their los s has passed
to t he buyer, or for goods identified to the contract i f the seller is unable aft er
r easonable effort to resell them at a reasonable price or such effort would be
unavai ling .
Thus i f t he u.c.c. applied, Feed Company could resell and recover damages as per
2-706, or rec over damag es for non-accept ance as per 2-708 but could not recover the
pur chas e pr i ce as such.
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10 ~att Dillon was an ~vid ~elevisiori fan an~, when his set broke down for the
third time in as many weeks; he decided to purchase a new one. Going to Superior
Tv Sales; Inc. he met Salesman Sam who offered to sell him a new 21 inch, 1963
model Big Screen television set for $399.95. Dillon told Sam that the two sets he
had owned previously had been made by Big Screen and had given him trouble and that
he would not be interested in buying another unless it was in perfect working condition. Sam replied that the new model Big Screen sets contained an improved picture
tube and a completely re-designed electrical system. "In this new assembly," said
Sam, "they have completely eliminated all difficulties found in earlier sets. You
will find the 1963 Big Screen set excellent and free from the defe~ts of previous
models." In reliance on this, Dillon purchased the set on signing, but not reading,
a standard sales contract tendered him by Sam.
During the first day of use, Dillon found that, as was true in earlier sets, the
picture made was dim, unstable and had sharp horizontal lines running through it.
He returned the set to Superior TV Sales, Inc. for repair and the service manager
assured him that it was a matter of adjustment and that he could pick up the set
in two days. Dillon did so, but found no material improvement in the operation of
the set. After two further unsuccessful attempts on the part of the service manager
to correct the difficulties, Dillon delivered the set to Superior TV Sales,Inc.
and asked for the return of his money. The service manager told Dillon that he was
very sorry but there was nothing he could do, adding that, although Salesman Sam
had not known it, the newly designed Big Screen s et had as many defects as the old.
Dillon then brought a suit for rescission of the sales contract. Superi or TV Sales
Inc. pleaded in defense a clause clearly printed in bold t ype in the standard sale~
contract disclaiming all warranties not included therei n. The only warranty recited
in the contract was one guaranteeing good title. The evidence was heard ore tenus
and all the foregoing facts were proved. Should the Court grant the prayer or--Di llon's bill?
(SALES) Yes. The statement to the effect that Dillon would f ind the set free from
all def ects of previous models was a material statement of fact, and so intended,
and meant to induce Dillon to buy the s et which he did. If false it is constructively fraudulent even i f made in good f aith. Its fal sity made t he entire contract
voidable i ncluding the clause t hat t here are no other warranties . The parol evidence
rule does not prohibit evidence to show that there is no contract. Here the purpose
of such evidence is not to vary the terms of a vali d contract but to voi d a voidable contract. 198 Va.557 on p.727 of the Contract Cases in t hese no~es.
t, ,

10. Jas on and Neras entered i nto t he f ollowing agreement 1-1i th r espect t o a speci ally
built computi ng machine :
"In consider a tion of ~plOOO t o be paid on r eceipt of machine, Jason hereby agrees
to sell and deliver t o Neras at. h:i.s office i.n Richmond , Va. , one 125 DX Compute r
#165 now in process of construction by Jason, on or befo r e June 1, 1965 ."
The machine was compl eted a c cor di n ~ t o specifications but t he night befor e i t was
to be delivered a fire of undetermined origin destroyed Jaacn 1 s plant and i t s
-· ............. _, ... _., .
c x .t.-.m ts in~lud i ng t he DX C<:;mputor. Jason claims that rJe:::-as owes hi..m the $1000 &nJ
~J 8 r as claim9 !i~500 damages f r om J aso11 fo r f e.ilu.re to deliver the computor. E<lch
co11 s ults his l awyer. (a ) Ho~1 ought J a3on to be advised? (b) How ought Neras to lle
ar:lvi scd7
( Sf\I~~~:)(a) Jason shoul d be advised t hat he has no right~ against Ner as~ Gince_ Ja~on
~:i 11 had so m e th~ng fu rther t o ~o and stil l had possess1on o~ the).. me.ch1.ne and 1:1 1.11
6
the better posi tl.on t o prote..::t 1 t , t he r isk of l oss was on hliTl be vh at common l a•r
and under U., C., C.,f/2-509.
(b ) Neras should be advised ~hat he has no cause of action fo : damages_for br ~ac h of
contrac t . u. C.C .// 2 ~· 613 r eads 1n part, "Where the contr<::c t requues for 1 ts performanc
goods ident Hi ed when t he contract is made , and the goods suffer casualty without
fault of either party before the risk of l oss passes to th\; buyer , ~r-::~~ ( a) i f the l oss
is t otal the contract is avo ided.
Officia.l comments to this sect i on indicate lhat the common l aw is the same .
-- ·· -· ··~

j¥h~
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Green Valley Grain Corp()ration was engaged, in Virginia, in the business
of processing and selling gra in& at wholesa le and retail. The Company received an
order from the Long Horn Cattl e Rench, in Texas, for 300 barrels of Grade A Hybrid
Yellow Corn, a well-known grade and s pecies of corn. Green Valley Grain Corpo~a
tion advised Long Horn Ca ttle Haneh that i t could not furnish the grade of corn
it had ordered but that it did have in its pos session a bin of Grade B Hybrid
Yellow Corn, not exceeding 300 barrels, which it would sell at $7.50 per barrel.
In respone to this advioe the Long Horn Cattle Ranch addressed a letter to Green
Valley Grain Corporation in which it s tated:
o~> ·

"We desire to purchase 3 at the price quot•3d in your letter, the enti:t>e bin
of Grade B Hyb:dd Yellow Gorn. Afte:r you have det ermined the number of
barre l s of oorn in the bin wire or call us and we ehall send our trucks to
pi ak up the corn.n
I n r epl;y, Green Valley Grain Corporation sent the following telegram to Long Horn
Cattle Ranch:
'' Holding bin of corn which you ordered by your last letter. Will meas ure a t
time of loading in ~'our trucks."
a nd, in reply , Long 11orn Cattle Ranch wired the Grain Corporation:
nReceived wirA, will pi ck up corn at your plant F'riday, March 20,1964.':
Thereafter, b~t prior to March 20, 196h, the storage bins and contents of Green Valley ,
without fault on its part, were destroyed by fire. Green Val l ey Gra in Corporatioi"l
consults you and inquires lJhether it ma y re~over from Long Horn Cattle Ranch the
purcha se price of the corn.
Hovr would you advi se?
(SALES) There are three good answers as follows:
(1) The correspondence set forth completed a contra~.:t of sal e and the corn has b3en
a ppropriated to the cont.ract. The mea suring does not involv0 any act of discretion
but is a purely mechanical job to determine the< amount due f or asc ertained goods.
Hence title had passed and seller may reoove~ the purcha se price. This is the view
of the Sales Act.
(2) There i s some aui:,hori t y th.:}t title had not pc:..ssed sinc e seller still had somet h ing to dov
(3) Under U.C.C o2-509(3) Se~lE>:r ha s no r :i.ghts a gainst Buyer. Seller was in possession, had the better opportur; :-_ty t o guard a ga i nst f i :::-e; and is the one ::nore apt to
oarry insurance a nd Buyer WP..8 not then in default. Under the UoC. C. the risk of loss
does not necessarily follow the title.
6.i) _bia_ler desires to sell Hardup a TV s et fo r $ 900 , paya ble $300 ca.sh, balance i n
s ix equal monthl y i nstallments and h e asks you by wha t means he may secur e , by
l ien on t he TV set, t he nnpaid installment s of purchas e money. What would you
advise him t o do?
(SALES )Under the present law Deal er and Hc:.rdup can ent er into a vJri tten a nd si gned
agr eeme nt f or a cond i t ional sale , or Hardup may giv e Deal er a pur chase money chattel
mor t gage, or a purchas e monay deed of trus t. '£hese s hould be proper ly recorded.
Und er t he u .c ., Cn 9-105 in pl ac e of suc h t erms as chatt -::1 mor t gage, c onditional
sale, etc, t he Arti cle subutit u t es t he gener al t er m " sec:urity agreement". The
pr operty subj ect t o the securi t y agroement is c:alled "collat er a l". The interest .
in the collat eral tha t is conYoyed by the debtor to t he secured party i s a tt secur~ty
i nterest''. I n our case Dea ler woul d secure a purchase money security int erest.
U4v o

(:J,C,C .9··l07) by a securit y a.greement sienod by the de bt.o~ (u.c .c . 9-203 ( l)(b)) ..
..:i:l.ca c onsumer goods (other tha n f ixt ures) are i nvolv ed here t he fi l ing of a financ ·O
i11G stat ement i s optional a nd i.s no t n e~essary f or t he perfec l:.ion of Dealer ' s
e01.~urity i nter est, but i f t he r e i s no suc h filing bona fide pur c haser s fo r value
f or thei own personal use t ake free of the rights of the secured party . ._,e e
u .c . C.9-J02(l)( d ) a nd 9-307(2).
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7 ~ "Pl aintiff, a housevTife, stopped for gasoline a~ a combination service station and
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grocery store, owned and operated exclusively by the Defendant, in Franklin CoQ~ty,
Va., where she had dealt for many years., VJhile Defendant was filling the gas tank
of her automobile, Plaintiff r emember ed she needed some bleach for the clothes she
intended to wash later t hat day. She entered the store, took dovm from a shelf a
plastic bottle of nBleach~All", a well-known brand, manufactured and distributed by
a large corporation with a national reputation. She returned with it to her car.
Defendant, who had been servici ng the automobile, was not aware of her activities.
She told him what she had done and requested him to charge the gasoline and bleach
to her accounto
In laundering her clothes, she used the nBleach-All 11 acc ording to directions. She
hung the clothes on a line to dry . When she returned s everal hours later, she discovered they had so deteriorated that they were unable to support their own weight
on the line and had fallen to the ground. It later developed that the damage to the
clothes had been caused from an erro~ made in mixing the chemicals during the
manufacture of 11 Bleach-All"o
She consults you as to her ri ght of action, if any, against Defendant. How should
you advise her·?
(SALES) I would advise her that she had a cause O.L actlon aga1nst Defendant. He is
a merchant and impliedly warrants that his merchandise is merchantable both at
common law and under · V#8.2~314 (u .c.c.)
f>

1
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10Nn March or 1966, while Paul Taylor w~~r J~it 1~g""a{~fhe"'h~~e '- ~r R~y -~~is,
Taylor expressed his admiration of an antique vase in Davis' living room. The next
day Taylor wrote and mailed to Davia the following letter:
"March 11, 1966
"Dear Ray:
As you know, I very much admired the beautiful vase in your living room which
the two of us discussed yesterday evening. I offer to buy it from you, and we can
later agree on the price. I would appreciate your letting me know whether you are
willing to sell it.
ttfs/ Paul Taylor"
On receiving this letter from Taylor, Davis wrote the following reply:
ttMarch 18, 1966
"Dear Paul:
I appreciate your letter of March 17th, and accept your offer to buy my vase.
I will send it to you tomorrow. The price I am asking is $600, that being the
amount at which it was appraised on the death of my mother from whom I inherited it.
•ts/s/ Ray Davis"
on receiving this letter from Davis, Taylor telephoned Davis and stated that he did
not want to purchase the vase because he thought the price was exorbitant, and that
in any event, he would not be able to accept delivery or pay for the ~se for many '
months. Shortly thereafter Davis tendered the vase to Taylor and, on its being refused, brought an action against Taylor in the Law and Equity Court of the City or
Richmond. In his motion for judgment Davis alleged the foregoing facts, charged
Taylor with breach of contract, and asked damages of $200. As exhibits with his
motion for judgment, Davis filed true copies of the letters or March 17 and 18 1966
Taylor filed a demurrer on the ground there was no binding contract or sale between•
himself and Davis because (a) the parties had not agreed on the purchase price, and
(b) the parties had not agreed on a time and place of delivery of the vase.
Should the demurrer be sustained on either, or both, pf these grounds?
(SALES) Under UCC and Code Va.8.2-305(1) The parties ~they so intend can conclude
a contract for sale even though the price is not settled and in such a case the
price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery. Here the parties intended to
consummate a sale with the price to be later agrred upon and therefore Taylor
breaches in refusing Davis' tender. Under 8.2-308 and -309 where time of delivery is
not fixed, it shall be at seller's place of busines~ ~r whe~e the goods are lo ated
The demurrer should be denied in both (a) and (b). -1' ·--:· ' '· ii d (' ,?,, <' ., • <' • ., - "' t9r 1, __ .,·
1

SALES
J){p6
10. ll11le Ridge Livestock, Inc., of Greene County, Virgi.nia, pursuant to a
written order, dated !Jovember 15, 19 " 6, shipped by rail a c.nrload of steers
to .S outhern Cattle Company. The sl-ipment was f.o.b. at the point of
delivery to the carrier. The purchase money was due and payable two days
after receipt of the shipment by the buyer. The carrier issued a nonnegotiable bill of lading for the shipment. \.Jhile the shipment was enroute,
the seller learned that the buyer WAS insolvent and had filed a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy. Before the shipment reached its destination the
carrier, upon directions of the seller. delivered the carload of steers

'

back to the seller. In an approprate action the Trust r:e in Bankruptcy
claimed the1t he was entitled to take possession of the steers an( to sell
t hem and apply the proceeds of the sale ratably among t 1 e general creditors
of Sbuthern Cattle Company.
How s hould the Sourt rule?
The court should rule in favor of the defendant~

Virginia ::>tatute

8Q2-705(1) states that the seller may stop delivery of goods in the

posse ssion of a carrier or other bailee l.hen he discovers the buyer to
be insolvent irrespective of passing of title. (See also va. Code 8.27 0 2)

9.~~itten memorandum was signed by both parties, who were residents of Virginia,
stating as follows:
"Sold to L. F. Benton by o. T. Sully one carload, 28 tons, 40% soy bean
meal, bagged, at $90 per ton wholesale. Delivered Beetletown, Virginia.
For November shipment. Dated Nov.4, 1966".
Sully obtained the meal from a processor and had it shipped by rail on Nov.27,
1966, with the bill of lading showing 28 tons. Benton had not received the meal by
Deo.3, and called Sully repeatedly advising that he had to have the same for his
customers. On Dec.4, the retail price of meal dropped from $100 to $80 per ton. On
Deo.S, 1966, the car arrived at the siding, but the seal on the door was broken,and
the ear only contained 20 tons of meal. The usual shipping time of such a shipment
was 5 to 12 days.
Benton refused to accept the shipment and so advised Sully and refused to pay for
the meal. Sully advised Benton that he would charge for 20 tons only or would divert
another shipment of meal. Sully found another shipment and diverted it, the second
car containing 8 tons of meal arriving at Beetletown on Deco 10. Benton continued
to refuse acceptance of any of the meal or make payment for the same. Sully later
managed to sell the meal at $70 a ton wholesale and brought an action at law against
Benton in a proper court for the difference of $20 per ton for 28 tons of meal.
Who should prevail in this action?
(SALES) The seller should prevail in this action. Where the exact quantity called
for has been shipped by the seller, and no time for delivery is fixed, and the
quantity shipped has been diminished in transit, without the knowledge or fault of
the seller, the buyer should notify the seller and give him a reasonable opportunity
to make good the deficiency. Buyer has no right to flatly refuse to accept the
shipment because of the deficiency thus occasioned.(l41 Vaol23) Furthermore~ now
under Va.8.2-S08, this rule of law has been codified in the Virginiaadoption of
the u.c.c.
lO~v~ones bo~ght and p~id Smith $ 1,0?0 for a bull and took immediate delivery of the
an1mal. Noth1ng was sa1d about the t1tle. Later Citizens Bank demanded payment of
$500 from Jones, or the surrender of the bull, because of a duly recorded lien it
~~eldon th~ bull but of which ?either Smith nor Jones had actual knowledge as it
, ~ad been g1ven by Carter, a pr1or owner of the bull.
~ What liability, if any, is there on Smith to Jones because of the transaction?
(SALES) The vendor is liable to Jones. In a contract for sale there is a warranty
by the seller that the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or
other lien or encumbrance of which the buyer at the time of contracting has no
knowledge. The recording of the lien does not _serve a~ actual knowledge• hence the
'
~rrantv of title stands up. (8 .2-312) t- 1 ,, , _.._,,_ -<-, 1] t-- ·t 1 •
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